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Abstract
This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is
ethically acceptable in research. The first half analyses the concept of
deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception:
normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are
preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical
question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person
from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the
reasonableness of withholding the information from the person who is
deceived. We further argue that the reasonableness of withholding
information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the
context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in
which withholding information from research participants is ethically
acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more
difficult to justify withholding information in the context of research than
elsewhere.
Introduction
One of a Research Ethics Committee’s main tasks is to ensure that potential
research participants are in a position to give valid consent. Research
participants cannot give consent without adequate information, and so ethics
3committees typically spend much of their time scrutinising the information
to be provided to research participants. Information provision in research is
an especially sensitive topic because of the uncertainty inherent in research,
the difficulty of balancing the relevant harms and benefits, and the fact that
research often exposes participants to risk without any compensating
benefit.
There are a number of standard problems with information provision in
research, such as ensuring information is provided in a manner which
enhances understanding, and how to overcome difficulties in understanding
the concept of randomisation. In this article we shall set all these problems
aside, and concentrate on cases where a researcher wants to withhold
information from the research participants on methodological grounds. If
some relevant information is not communicated in the types of case we are
interested in, this is not because of a mistake or incompetence, but rather
because the information is withheld intentionally.
In the light of scandals such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and Milgram’s
obedience to authority experiments, Research Ethics Committees are often
very reluctant to allow research which they believe to involve deception to
go ahead. However there are certain kinds of research that cannot be done
without deception: in some instances providing certain kinds of information
about the study will invalidate the results, as it may lead to the participants
modifying their behaviour in light of this knowledge. To take just one
example, research into socially disliked attitudes can usually not proceed
4without some form of deception. Clearly you will not gain a true insight into
the extent of discrimination against people with mental health problems if
you inform your research subjects that this is what you are researching,
given that people are typically reticent about admitting to attitudes which
are subject to social disapproval.
As the kinds of information that can be discovered by such deceptive studies
can be very useful, it seems too extreme to claim that deception in research
can never be justified. But as often in ethics the difficult question is where
to draw the line. In this article we look in detail at two cases of possible
research designs – one of which we think falls on the right side of the line of
ethical acceptability, and the other on the wrong side – and by reflecting on
these two cases, formulate a principle to help guide judgements about when
deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research.
We begin, however, by analysing the concept of deception. We argue that
there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative
accounts. Normative accounts of deception make the ethical question of
whether a particular case of misleading is justifiable integral to the question
whether it counts as a case of deception, whilst non-normative accounts do
not. We argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. More specifically,
we argue that where A intends to mislead B, and succeeds in so doing, this is
a case of deception irrespective of whether this misleading is ethically
justifiable and so the claim that ethical justifiability should play a role in the
5definition of deception is false. If this non-normative account of deception is
correct, then it is a mistake for ethics committees to set too much store by
the question of whether a given research project involves deception, given
that the fact that a piece of research involves deception does not in and of
itself make it morally problematic.
The second half of the article argues that what ethics committees should be
focusing on in cases of withholding information is the reasonableness of
withholding the information from the person who is deceived, and that the
reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The
last section examines how the context of research should shape our
judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from
research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important
features of research make it more difficult to justify withholding information
in the context of research than elsewhere.
When is withholding information deceptive?
In an interesting recent article analysing the concept of deception, Sokol
argues that there is an asymmetry between misleading by intentionally
giving false information, and misleading by intentionally withholding
information. The former is always deceptive, whilst whether the latter
counts as deceptive depends on what expectations would be reasonable in
the circumstances. Sokol argues for this claim as follows: “At any one time,
people hold hundreds of false beliefs. They do not, however, expect others
to correct them unless there is good reason to do so. Just as we hold many
6false beliefs about the world, so do we withhold true beliefs from others.
Because there is generally no expectation to reveal those true beliefs, it
would be odd to say we are concealing them from others, let alone that we
are deceiving them.” [1, p.460]
Sokol draws the conclusion that whether withholding information is
deceptive in a given circumstance depends on three things: (a) the agent’s
intention, (b) what expectations would be normatively reasonable in the
circumstances, and (c) whether the attempted deception is successful.
Hence, he argues that I can deliberately set out to mislead you about
whether I have a particular book by hiding it when you come round to my
house, and even if I am successful in misleading you, this will still not count
as deception if your expectation that I would tell the truth about the contents
of my book collection were normatively unreasonable. [1, p.460)]
We have two worries about this account of deception by omission. First, it
gains much of its plausibility by running together cases where someone
withholds information with the intention that another person will form a
false belief, and cases where information is withheld, but where there is no
intention that the other person form or retain a false belief. In the latter
category, someone could condone the fact that another person was fairly
likely to form (or maintain) a false belief without it being their intention that
the other person do so.
Suppose the man next to me on the bus has spinach stuck to his tooth, and I
7do not mention this to him, as he is a perfect stranger and I do not want to
embarrass him. In these circumstances, I may keep quiet with the intention
of not embarrassing him, being aware that he may well draw the conclusion
that there is nothing amiss about his appearance. We agree with Sokol that
in cases such as this I do not deceive the stranger. But the reason that my
silence is not deceptive need not be that there was no reasonable expectation
that I mention the spinach; it could equally well be claimed that the reason I
do not deceive the stranger is that I do not intend to mislead him. It follows
that cases of this kind do little to support the claim that deception by
omission requires that the speaker have a reasonable expectation that the
truth will be told in the circumstances.
Second, we think that intentional withholding of information can still be
deceptive, even if there would be no normatively reasonable expectation
that the person withholding the information would reveal what they know in
the given context. Take the following case.
Harry. Harry is a gifted sleight of hand magician, who happens
to work in a coffee shop. When a customer asks for a glass of
water, he likes to pour them the glass in plain view, and then
using sleight of hand, replace this glass with another identical
glass of water, which he poured a few moments before and
cunningly concealed about his person. The customer is in no
way harmed by Harry’s sleight of hand, as the two glasses of
water are equivalent in every way.
8The first thing to say is that Harry does not tell the customer that the glass of
water she receives is the same as the one she initially sees; rather he is
relying on the customer’s natural assumption that the glass of water she
receives is one and the same as the one she saw being poured. So if this is a
case of deception, it is a case of deception by omission, rather than
commission.
We take it that the fact that the glass of water that the customer sees is a
different glass of water from the one that she in fact receives is not a piece
of information which is material to her desire to have a glass of water. And
it seems hard to see that a reasonable person would have reason to object to
the fact that they are not given the actual glass of water they saw being
poured, but rather an identical one.1
We think that in this case Harry does deceive the customer, even though the
fact that the glass of water is a different one from the one the customer saw
is not relevant to the fulfilment of the customer’s desire for the glass of
water. In other words, Harry deceives the customer despite the fact that
there would not be a reasonable expectation for him to tell the customer that
the glass of water she receives is not the original one she saw, but rather an
identical one.
1 Unless of course they thought that this was deceptive, and that they were wronged by
being deceived. However this would support the claim that we are trying to get to,
namely that Harry does deceive the customer.
9If this analysis of the case of Harry the magician is correct, then it suggests
that intentionally causing someone to hold a false belief is a sufficient
condition for deception, whether or not the information about which the
person is misled about is information that they had a reasonable expectation
of being told. If this is the case, then it is false to argue that it is a necessary
condition for deception by omission that the person who is deceived has a
reasonable expectation of receiving the information that is withheld from
them.
We also think that there is a second type of case which reveals a problem
with normative conceptions of deception like Sokol’s, namely where a
person is engaged in action which is so immoral that they could not
reasonably expect someone to help them achieve their goal. If a murderer
comes to the door, and asks whether his innocent target is hiding inside, then
certainly I should attempt to bring it about that the murderer does not
believe that that the innocent person is hiding inside. But we are not at all
sure that the would-be murderer has anything like a normatively reasonable
expectation that I should reveal what I know to him. Hence it looks like on
Sokol’s account I probably do not deceive him if I send him away with an
intentionally misleading statement. But this seems counter-intuitive to us.
We think that these two problems suggest that a non-normative conception
of deception is preferable. On a non-normative conception of deception, to
call something deceptive is not in and of itself to make a moral judgement
about the conduct. Hence on such a view, saying that a piece of research
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involves deceiving the research participants is not yet to make a moral claim
about the research. Whilst we do not think that the idea of reasonable
expectations is helpful in thinking about what deception is, it will form a
key part of our account of why some cases of deception are more ethically
problematic than others. With this in mind, let us pass on to analyse our two
cases about withholding information in research.
Two Cases of Withholding Information In
Research
We have used the following two cases in ethics training for Research Ethics
Committees as part of the Centre for Professional Ethics’s Knowledge
Transfer activities. Bamforth is fictional, whereas Rucola is modified
version of a real case reported by a participant in one of our training days.
Rucola was turned down by the Research Ethics Committee on the grounds
that it deceived the subjects as to the true nature of the trial. We shall be
suggesting that the committee in question made the wrong decision, and for
the wrong reason.
Bamforth. John Bamforth is an internationally recognised expert
in human communication studies. He approaches you, prior to
seeking ethics committee approval, to see if you (and your
Cancer Care Centre) would be willing to participate in his
newest study. He is interested in discovering the techniques by
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which healthcare professionals attempt to break bad news; and
he hopes that the results of his research will in the future help to
improve best practice in this difficult area. For his latest research
project, he proposes to set up a relatively unobtrusive
unattended camera in the room in which the healthcare
professional breaks the bad news to the patient. He will analyse
the communication (both what is said and what is unsaid), and
the body language of both participants, and write a number of
papers on the subject of the best way to break bad news.
He proposes to seek consent from all the healthcare
professionals to be involved in the study, and also all the
patients. He does not want to scare the patients beforehand, so
he will tell them merely that he is interested in how doctors talk
to patients, and will not specifically mention the issue of
breaking bad news. All persons will be anonymised for the
purpose of the study, and he will destroy his tapes as soon as he
has completed the relevant publications.
Rucola. Professor Rucola is a nutritional scientist and proposes
to carry out a study measuring salad eating habits in the general
public. She will ask members of the public to fill in a
questionnaire on their eating habits in general over a period of
time and from this material she will gather information on salad
consumption. Her consent form will explain that she is carrying
out research on eating habits, but will not mention that she is
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only interested in salad consumption as she is worried that
revealing this fact will distort the results, i.e. if people know that
she is measuring salad eating habits, and given assumptions
about healthy eating and the benefits of eating salad, her
subjects will either change their eating habits or inaccurately
report their eating habits for the duration of the trial.
Most people (in our admittedly unscientific sample of research ethics
committee members) tend to think that Bamforth is much more ethically
problematic than Rucola, and when asked to justify this, tend to explain the
difference as being in large part due to the fact that Bamforth involves
deception, whilst Rucola does not. We agree with the claim that Bamforth is
more ethically problematic, but we do not think that deceptiveness has
anything to do with this, for two reasons. First, as we have just argued,
whether withholding information is deceptive or not does not by itself make
any difference to the moral judgements we ought to make. Second, there are
reasons for thinking that Rucola is as deceptive as Bamforth: both cases are
similar insofar as disclosure of the precise purpose of the study would
invalidate the study’s methodology; as in both cases participants would alter
their behaviour if they knew it was being measured during the trial.
Moreover, in both cases the researchers deliberately withhold information
which is relevant to understanding the purpose of the research, and in so
doing intentionally mislead the trial participants as to the purpose of the
research. Given a non-normative conception of deception, we think that it is
very plausible to say that both studies involve the researcher deceiving the
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research participants. (The inclination to say that Rucola is not deceptive
comes, we think, from an erroneous attachment to a normative account of
deception).
However, to say that the researchers are deceptive in both cases is not to say
that they act wrongly in both cases: rather, we shall argue that only
Bamforth involves wrongful deception, as the deception in Rucola – like the
magician case – is one that a reasonable person would have no reason to
object to.
In Bamforth, the fact that the observer is interested only in interviews that
break bad news seems significant to the decision whether to participate.
Participating in a trial on the breaking of bad news seems significantly
different to participating in a trial on doctor-patient communication in
general. The reason for this is that the nature of the news being
communicated is potentially very sensitive and very distressing. A potential
participant who would be willing to participate in a general communication
trial, may not be willing to participate in a trial where she is observed while
being told very sensitive and very distressing news.
In Rucola, the information that the observer is only interested in salad eating
habits is innocuous in that it would not affect a reasonable participant’s
willingness to participate. Participants who decided that the aims of a trial
on nutrition are significant enough to persuade them to give up their time to
record their eating habits would not alter their decision by finding out that
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this was indeed a study on specific rather than general eating habits. Salad
eating habits are not contentious in the way that being told bad news is.
Therefore, the fact that this is a trial on salad eating habits is not crucial to
making the decision of whether to participate or not.
Hence we think that it would be best for an ethics committee to reject
Bamforth on the grounds of wrongful deception as it stands, whilst the
deception in Rucola is not ethically problematic. It might be objected that in
the Bamforth case the deception does not increase the risk of harm inherent
in the breaking of bad news, and that hence the fact that the overall context
is one in which there is a risk of harm does not show that there is a moral
difference in the deception in the two cases. We think this is a mistake. One
of the relevant moral differences concerns the potential violation of privacy
in Bamforth. Notice that whilst violations of privacy will very often be
harmful, it is plausible to think that violations of privacy can be wrong even
where they do not cause harm. Such actions would fall into the category that
Joel Feinberg described as “harmless wrongdoing”.[2] If this is right, then
even if no additional risk of harm occurs as a result of the deception in
Bamforth, the researcher’s actions might still be wrongful in virtue of being
a breach of privacy.
We conclude that the operative moral principle should not be whether or not
a given piece of research involves deception, but whether it involves
deception that is prima facie wrongful. (To say that deception in a given
circumstance is prima facie wrongful is to say that deceiving in this case
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would be wrong if there were no other moral principles relevant to the
situation. Where there are other moral principles such as non-maleficence
operative, we may sometimes judge that the prima facie wrongfulness of a
given piece of deception can be outweighed. Providing an account of how
such balancing is to be performed is beyond the scope of this article).
One could object here that there is nothing stopping Bamforth from re-
describing the aims of the trial to involve general communications issues.
This raises two possibilities. It might be the case that Bamforth then
intentionally misdescribes the aims of the trial in order to obtain ethics
approval. However this is clearly unethical as Bamforth is then seeking to
deceive the ethics committee as to his true purpose. On the other hand, it
might be the case that Bamforth’s initial aims are rather broad, e.g.
doctor/patient communications in general, but a more narrow theme
emerges during the trial, e.g. claims relating to the breaking of bad news. In
such a case, as long as researchers are acting in good faith in their original
description of the project there is no deception, it’s simply that the aims of
the trial have changed during its course.2
We suggest that ethics committees should take deceptive withholding of
information to be prima facie wrongful only where it deprives a research
participant of information that would be relevant to the decision of a
reasonable person as to whether to join the research project. Notice that
there may be some people who would object to the withholding of
2 This change may necessitate re-affirming consent to participate, but this issue is outside
the scope of this paper.
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information that a reasonable person would not object to. For instance in the
Rucola case, there might be someone who had a pathological hatred of
salad, and who was most unhappy at the prospect of taking part in a piece of
research which could form the basis of a campaign to increase salad uptake.
Whilst it is important for ethics committees to be representative, and to
make sure that they do not make judgements of ‘reasonableness’ which
reflect their narrow cultural or class interests, it is impossible for ethics
committees to take into account every possible set of values, however
unusual, in thinking about information provision. The primary job of an
ethics committee is to determine whether a given research project is suitable
for researchers to invite participants to take part in it. This is a general task,
which by definition cannot be tailored specifically to each possible set of
values. Hence where the participants recruited are competent adults the
participants must bear some responsibility for informing researchers of
unusual values they may have that research ethics committees might not
have taken into account in thinking about whether the research project is
ethically acceptable.
Our principle for determining when deceptive withholding of information is
ethically acceptable relies on the idea of reasonableness, and so is in an
obvious way indeterminate. In part this is an inescapable feature of
principles. However, in the final section we shall attempt to flesh out the
principle a bit, by arguing that there is good reason to think that our
standards of reasonable revelation of information should be higher in
17
research than elsewhere.
Why Research as a Context Creates a Strong
Presumption of Revelation
The profile of the risks in research is most unusual, and this has effects on
the way we should conceive of reasonable provision of information in
research. In short, the nature of research as a context creates a
presupposition that more rather than less information will be provided, and
hence makes it more difficult to justify deceptive withholding of
information than elsewhere.
Hansson and Hermansson [3] argue that in any risk management problem
there are three parties. First, there are those on whom the risk is imposed;
second there are those who control the risk; and third there are those who
benefit from the risk being run. Their chief thought is that the first thing we
should do in looking at a risk management context is ask whether it is a
context in which the same person occupies all three roles, or whether it is a
context in which the controller of the risk and the beneficiary of the risk are
different from the person who is subjected to the risk.
Where one and the same person benefits from the risk and can control the
risk that they are exposing themselves to, then the context of risk is least
ethically problematic: a case of this sort would be when an experienced
mountaineer climbs a difficult mountain. Most ethically problematic are
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those cases where the risk-exposed neither benefit from their risk exposure
nor can control their exposure to the risk: a case of this kind would be where
a company pollutes the local water supply because this is cheaper than
disposing of their waste properly, and local residents have no option but to
continue drinking the water.
Research has two features that push it towards the more ethically
problematic end of the risk management spectrum. First, research does not
aim specifically to benefit the participants: instead the aim is to generate
new knowledge. Even in cases of so-called therapeutic research, what
makes the intervention research as opposed to treatment is the attempt to
generate new knowledge, and the specifically research elements of the
treatment do not seek directly to benefit the patient. [4, p.21] Given that
those exposed to the risks of research are not intended to benefit from the
risk imposition, this immediately makes the risk context more problematic
than the mountain-climber case.
Second, the research participant has limited control over his or her risk
exposure: the typical research participant is very unlike the experienced
mountaineer who can see the rockface above (and has probably climbed the
route before), and can at each stage decide which way to ascend in order to
ensure safety. The chief ways research participants can control the risks they
are exposed to are the informed consent process, and their right of exit from
the research project. Given the typical power relations between researchers
and researched, ethics committees are usually rightly reluctant to place too
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much of the needed weight of risk management on the right of exit from
research. It follows that a great deal of the problems of risk management in
research need to be solved by the informed consent process. Valid consent
requires that the participant be given information adequate to making a
reasonable decision as to whether to take part in the research or not. Where
the information revealed is less than all that is relevant, then the participant
does not have adequate control of the risk, and the risks imposed begin to
look more like those in the water pollution case than in the mountain
climber case.
Given the nature of the risk management problems that the context of
research presents, we think that there is a reasonable presumption that all
facts, which would be relevant to making the decision to take part in the
research project, will be revealed. And therefore, given this reasonable
presupposition, the failure to do so will in general be prima facie ethically
unacceptable. However, where methodological considerations require
deceptive withholding of information from participants, and the information
withheld is not relevant to the decision that a reasonable person would make
as to whether to participate in the research, deceptive withholding of
information is permissible.
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